Joint Tenancy Disclaimers: What Can Be Disclaimed? by Harl, Neil E.
Volume 3 | Number 12 Article 1
6-5-1992
Joint Tenancy Disclaimers: What Can Be
Disclaimed?
Neil E. Harl
Iowa State University, harl@iastate.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, Agricultural Economics Commons,
Agriculture Law Commons, and the Public Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Iowa State University Digital Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Agricultural Law Digest by an authorized administrator of Iowa State University Digital Repository. For more information, please contact
digirep@iastate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Harl, Neil E. (1992) "Joint Tenancy Disclaimers: What Can Be Disclaimed?," Agricultural Law Digest: Vol. 3: No. 12, Article 1.
Available at: http://lib.dr.iastate.edu/aglawdigest/vol3/iss12/1
 Agricultural Law Digest
Volume 3, No. 12    June 5, 1992
Editor: Robert P. Achenbach, Jr. esq.        Contributing Editor Dr. Neil E. Harl, esq.    ISSN 1051-2780
Agricultural Law Digest is published by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr, P.O. Box 5444, Madison, WI 53705, biweekly except June and December.  Annual
subscription $100.  Copyright 1992 by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr. and Neil E. Harl.  No part of this newsletter may be reproduced or transmitted in any form
or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage or retrieval system, without prior permission
in writing from the publisher.  Printed on recycled paper by Accurate Business Service, Madison, WI.
89
JOINT TENANCY DISCLAIMERS:
WHAT CAN BE DISCLAIMED?
— by Neil E. Harl*
 For years the Internal Revenue Service resisted the
disclaimer of joint tenancy interests on the grounds that the
disclaimer had to occur within nine months of the creation of
the joint tenancy.1  IRS eventually came to accept the
disclaimer of revocable joint tenancies within nine months
after death2 and even more recently indicated that the Service
would not resist the disclaimer of joint tenancy interests in
other than revocable joint tenancies where there was a pre-
death right to sever the joint interests.3
The focus on when joint tenancies could be disclaimed
obscured the question of what could be disclaimed.
What can be disclaimed
In Ltr. Rul. 9012053,4 the decedent had purchased a bond
in joint tenancy with his wife on March 6, 1989.  The
decedent died on April 15, 1989.  On December 6, 1989, the
wife disclaimed her entire interest in the bond.  The ruling
recites that the disclaimer of her one-half was possible
because the disclaimer was within nine months of the
creation of the joint tenancy, March 6, 1989.  In the case of
the two bank accounts in the ruling, to which the decedent
contributed all of the funds, the wife proposed to execute
disclaimers prior to January 15, 1990, of the one-half
interest that would have passed to her by survivorship.  The
ruling recites that there was no transfer at the time the
deposits were made and the transfer did not occur at the
decedent's death.  Therefore, the disclaimer could be made
within nine months after death and a one-half survivorship
interest could be disclaimed.
The key question is why the wife, as the survivor, could
not have disclaimed all of the bank accounts inasmuch as no
transfer took place to the wife prior to the husband's death.
The same ruling permitted a disclaimer of one-half of the
total interest in a residence that was acquired in 1969 at a
time when joint tenancy or tenancy by the entirety interests
(which this was) were not gifts to the non contributing
tenant by the entirety.  In the facts of that ruling, the
decedent had not made an election to treat the acquisition of
the  residence  as  a  gift  of  a proportionate part to his wife.
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Therefore, as to both the bank accounts and the residence, the
decedent was deemed to be the owner for federal gift tax
purposes during life yet only one-half was disclaimed.
In Ltr. Rul. 8916070,5 a joint brokerage account account
was involved which is also not deemed to be a gift at the
time of creation of the account.6  Again, a one-half interest
was disclaimed.7  Several other private letter rulings have
also been issued, all involving disclaimers of one-half
interests.8
In McDonald v. Commissioner,9 which involved joint
tenancy interests in realty, the attorney for the estate has
confirmed that only one-half was disclaimed in that case.10
The Service took the position in Ltr. Rul.
882707211 that a surviving joint tenant could disclaim the
entire interest in an account where the entire value was
included in the deceased joint tenant's gross estate but that
for husband-wife joint tenancies after 1981, I.R.C. § 2040(b)
specifies that only one-half would be included in the deceased
joint tenant's gross estate.  Therefore, the surviving joint
tenant's disclaimer was limited to one-half of the amount.
This argument seems to focus on the wrong aspect of the
transaction in determining whether a transfer had taken place
to the surviving joint tenant.  That letter ruling12 would
have the federal estate tax rule determine whether a transfer
had taken place.  Arguably, the focus should be on the
situation at the time the joint tenancy was created.  At
present, no gift occurs on creation of a joint tenancy in a
bank or brokerage account13 or in U.S. Government savings
bonds.14  After 1954 and before 1982, joint tenancies in real
property involving a husband and wife did not involve a gift
on creation of the joint tenancy15 unless treated as a gift on a
gift tax return timely filed.16  In one recent case, the court
applied the consideration-furnished rule17 rather than the
fractional share rule18 to husband-wife joint tenancy interest
created before 1982 but dying after 1981 with the entire
amount included in the gross estate of the first to die and
receiving a new income tax basis.19
It should be noted that the regulations take the position
that a joint tenant cannot make a qualified disclaimer of any
portion of a joint interest attributable to consideration
furnished by that joint tenant.20
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
POSSESSION.  The disputed property was originally
owned by a corporation which terminated in 1939.  One of
the remaining shareholders deeded the land to a son who
rented and eventually deeded the property to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff used the property as cattle pasture and allowed
other ranchers to occasionally use the property as a resting
place and for grazing.  The court held that the plaintiff did
not own the property through the deed from the corporation
because the shareholder did not have the authority to transfer
ownership.  The court also held that the plaintiff had
acquired title through adverse possession, continuous since
the plaintiff started renting the property from the
shareholder's son.  The property so acquired included both
the fenced and unfenced property because the only other uses
of the unfenced property were by permission of the plaintiff.
Rice v. Hill City Stock Yards Co., 826 P.2d
1328 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990).
BANKRUPTCY
  GENERAL  
AVOIDABLE TRANSFERS .  The debtor had
inherited the right to receive payments under a promissory
note and had assigned a number of those payments to a third
party for cash.  The debtor later assigned the remaining
payments to the debtor's daughter for $10 while the debtor
owed several creditors.  The court held that the assignment
of the remainder payments was a fraudulent transfer under
state law and avoidable by the trustee. In re  Davis, 1 3 8
B.R. 106 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1992).
EXEMPTIONS.
OBJECTIONS.  The debtor claimed exemptions for the
debtor's interest in a profit sharing plan and an IRA.  The
trustee convened the first meeting of creditors on August 8,
1990, but at the end of the meeting, the trustee announced
that the meeting was to be continued generally and
reconvened at a later unspecified date.  The trustee did not
announce a date for another creditors' meeting and 15
months later filed objections to the debtor's exemption
claims.  The court held that a continued creditors' meeting
was deemed concluded for Bankr. Rule 4003(b) purposes at
the end of the meeting if the trustee, within 30 days after
the creditors' meeting, does not set a specific date for a
continuance.  The court also held that a debtor's claimed
exemptions would be allowed for failure of the trustee to
object within 30 days after a creditors' meeting, even if the
exemption claim does not have a good faith statutory basis.
Note: the second holding was also reached by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Taylor v. Freeland & Kronz, see p. 83
supra.   In re  Levitt, 137 B.R. 881 (Bankr. D .
Mass. 1992).
PENSION PLAN.  The debtor claimed an exemption
under Ind. Code § 34-2-28-1(a)(6) in the debtor's interest in
an ERISA qualified profit sharing plan.  Under the plan the
debtor had the right to distribution in case of termination of
employment or financial hardship and could borrow from
the vested amount.  The court held that the debtor's interest
in the plan was property of the estate because the plan did
not qualify as a spendthrift trust where the debtor had such
access rights. The court held that ERISA did not provide a
federal nonbankruptcy law exemption. The court also held
that the Indiana exemption was pre-empted by ERISA.
Matter of VanMeter, 137 B.R. 908 (Bankr. N . D .
Ind. 1992).
The debtor claimed an exemption under Wis. Stat. §
815.18(31) in the debtor's interest in an ERISA qualified
profit sharing plan.  Under the plan the debtor had the right
to distribution in case of termination of employment or
financial hardship and could borrow from the vested amount.
The court held that the interest in the plan was excluded
from the estate under ERISA as a federal nonbankruptcy law
exemption. In re  Shaker, 137 B.R. 930 (Bankr.
W.D. Wis. 1992).
